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ABSTRACT
This study attempted to determine the effect of manip­
ulating the structure of a story on the production of inferences 
in recall. One independent variable, story structure, was manip­
ulated four times. Each manipulation was administered to one of 
four groups composed of Communication 1113 students. After the 
presentation of the stimulus material, a question packet was 
administered to each subject. The questionnaire tapped the 
three dependent variables; recall of cause, recall of conse­
quence, and recall of congruency. In addition, the instrument 
also tapped the subjects' confidence in the accuracy of their 
answers. Analysis of the results revealed that when a story 
node is deleted or made incongruent, the subjects will produce 
inferences in recalling the manipulated node. The results also 
revealed that the manipulation of the cause node has a greater 
effect on recall than the manipulation of the consequence node. 
Testing of the confidence scores revealed that subjects were not 
aware of making cause or congruency inferences but were aware 
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THE EFFECT OF MESSAGE STRUCTURE ON 
INFERENCE MAKING IN RECALL
CHAPTER I 
RATIONALE AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction
For years communication scholars have conducted research 
on communication related factors which seemingly affect message 
output. Those factors include source variables, receiver vari­
ables, and message variables. Even our communication textbooks 
teach that a message can be adapted so that receivers properly 
understand the meaning. Despite everything that we have learned 
about the way human beings communicate with each other, we are 
still unable to exchange messages without some kind of distor­
tion taking place.
Several attempts have been made to explain information 
distortion. These explanations include distortion caused by 
selective perception and distortion caused by information stor­
age and recall processes in either long term or short term mem­
ory. All of these are valid explanations, but some types of 
information distortion are still not adequately explained. One 
of these is the distortion caused by inference making.
Many approaches to information processing have treated 
memory as a linear, step-by-step process which begins with 
encoding and ends with decoding. However, the memory process, 
like the communication process, may not be linear. Instead, 
the process may be interactive. If memory is an interactive 
process, all phases of information processing interact, 
beginning with the message that is encoded and continuing 
through the recall of the same information. An interactive 
approach could address the distortion that occurs when individ­
uals recall information which is different from the message 
they originally heard.
Frequently, the information individuals recall includes 
inferences. An inference can be defined as an attempt to make 
information fit into existing expectations. Inferences occur 
when individuals add, delete, or reorganize a message in such 
a manner that the meaning of the original message is changed.
In other words, inferences are a form of information distortion. 
A possible explanation of where inferences occur in the memory 
process may be found in the interaction between the stages of 
encoding and decoding information. The encoded information 
seems to be integrated into and affected by the person's memory 
system. One method of integrating new information into the 
existing memory structure will be called schematic processing.^
A number of researchers have discussed this type of 
information processing, but they have used a variety of labels. 
The term schematic processing will integrate these various labels.
Schematic processing is a memory process which utilizes 
schema (schemata). Bartlett (1932) used the term schema to 
refer to the central cognitive structure in perception. As 
the central cognitive structure of perception, schema acts as 
an intermediary between the encoded message and recall.
Schemata provide plans or maps for perceiving incoming 
information. In this capacity schemata are large units of 
knowledge that organize much of what individuals know about 
the world around them. As large units of knowledge, schemata 
establish sets of expectations for incoming information. These 
expectations are formed as a person grows and learns about the 
surrounding world. An individual learns that certain types of 
events occur in certain ways; and that person uses that set of 
expectations or schema to predict or perceive incoming infor­
mation. One schema which is discussed further in this paper 
causes a person to expect information to be presented in a par­
ticular sequence. This expectation is especially applicable 
to information in story form.
When individuals use schematic processing, the incoming 
information is perceived and categorized according to the 
appropriate schemata or schema. However, the system can only 
process the message as it is presented. Because the message 
which is recalled is not always the same as the original, some­
thing must happen between the encoding of the message and 
recall. Very possibly, an interaction is occurring between the 
message as it is presented and the receiver's schema. As the
system perceives and integrates the message into memory, the 
schema probably determines what is stored and recalled by 
making the information fit the existing expectations. Evidence 
indicates that this type of process does indeed occur.
Much evidence indicates that during schematic processing, 
some inferences are created as messages are first comprehended 
(Graesser, Robertson, and Anderson, 1981). Other researchers 
(Schank, 1973 and 1975; and Schank and Abelson, 1977) feel that 
a foundation exists for constructing conceptual representations 
which include both information that was truly in the message as 
well as inferences about the information during schematic pro­
cessing. The evidence strongly suggests that the message and 
the receiver's schema do interact and the interaction deter­
mines what is remembered.
This study examines the interaction of a particular type 
of message, stories, and schemata in an attempt to see if the 
interaction between the two may explain how information distor­
tion in the form of inferences occurs in some messages. In 
order to address this issue, two areas must first be explored. 
The first area is inferences. The section on inferences 
attempts to find when and where inferences' occur in the memory 
process. The second area discusses story structure (the organ­
izational pattern of the message). This section will compare 
the original message with recall and further explore the notion 
of an interaction between story structure and schematic pro­
cessing. After the review of these two areas, hypotheses are 
presented which further explore the question.
Inferences
Function and Type of Inference
Schank (1975) functionally defines inference as a 
"process in which an individual tries to represent incoming 
information in a well-defined structure." In other words, an 
inference is a tool used to make information fit into an existing 
information category. In this capacity, inferences serve two 
main functions: (a) they fill in gaps in the structure of the
incoming information (slot-filling) and (b) they connect events 
in the structure with other events in order to provide a higher 
level of organization (text-connection).
Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso (1979) feel that infer­
ences are based primarily upon three identifiable sources of 
information. The first is logical relations between events in 
the text. The relations are causes, motivations, and conditions 
allowing the events. An example of an inference based on logi­
cal relations would occur if a receiver inferred why a particu­
lar act was done. The second source of inferences is the infor­
mational relations between events in the text. Examples are 
specific people, instruments, objects, times, places, and con­
texts of events; in other words, who, what, when, and where. If 
a receiver infers that an act in a story was performed by using 
a particular tool, then the inference is based on informational 
relations. The third source is world knowledge. This includes 
knowledge about vocabulary, items referred to and the functional 
relations among them. This category is based upon prior
knowledge and perceptions and it affects the other two cate­
gories. Using these sources of information, an individual 
(listener or reader) focuses on the present (focal point) and 
uses this focal point to connect events from the past and to 
predict future events.
Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso (1979) also theorized 
that these same sources of information are used to fill empty 
slots in a story. They felt that individuals use their world 
knowledge (past experience and knowledge) to infer information 
missing in a story.
The slot filling and connections are made with various 
types of inferences which occur with such regularity that they 
can be categorized. Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso (1979) 
placed inferences into two categories. The first category is 
logical inferences. Inferences in this category are bi-direc­
tional. They can predict forward or connect things from the 
past. Logical inferences answer the questions "why" and "how." 
The second category of inferences is value inferences. These 
are evaluative judgements on the actions of characters, inten­
tions of the sources, or the validity of the events.
In addition, the researchers theorized that inferences 
will be produced in four degrees. The first is called first- 
order inferences. These are consistent with but undetermined 
by information in the text. This category consists of straight 
additions to world knowledge such as elaborative inferences and 
any guesses at nonindicated causes and motivations. This group
of inferences is not used to connect parts of a story, they 
merely add information. Second-order inferences are deter­
mined but irrelevant. This means that the inference is 
implied by the text but does not specifically contribute to 
the flow of the story.
The next two orders of inferences are relevant to the 
flow of the story. Third-order inferences, however, are only 
relevant to the flow of a narrative. In addition, these infer­
ences are determined by the text as being relevant and function 
in the interpretation of information on the basis of one's 
world knowledge and determining what happened and why. Unlike 
third-order inferences, fourth-order inferences are not rele­
vant to the flow of the story. Fourth-order inferences are 
redundant. They duplicate information which is already ade­
quate to specify the story event, and thus add nothing new to 
the progress of the story text.
A review of some studies which have examined the produc­
tion of inferences in the recall of information will show a bit 
better when and where inferences occur.
Location of Inferences
One place inferences occur is in the listener's integra­
tion of pieces of information. Bransford and Franks (1972) 
tested this notion in a study in which they presented a group 
of related sentences to their subjects. The stimulus sentences 
presented were either four simple sentences or combinations of 
two or three simple sentences :
a. The ants are in the kitchen.
b. The ant ate the jelly.
c. The jelly was sweet.
d. The jelly was on the table.
e. The ants in the kitchen ate the jelly.
f. The ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly.
After the memory phase of the study, the subjects were asked to 
(1) identify sentences which they had heard and combined sen­
tences which they had not heard, and to (2) tell how confident 
they were about their choices. The subjects all stated their 
claims with a high level of confidence. In many cases, however, 
subjects claimed that they had heard sentences which combined 
four simple sentences when in actuality none of these were 
presented in the experiment. An example of one of the "remem­
bered" sentences was "the ants in the kitchen ate the sweet 
jelly which was on the table." The subjects thought that they 
had heard a combination of sentences a, b, c, and e presented 
above. These results strongly suggest that information gathered 
from the semantic interpretation of related sentences is stored 
together and integrated in memory. However, as the information 
is integrated, inferences are made. As the subjects remembered 
the information they also inferred relationships between the 
parts of the whole. These inferences seemed to be a spontaneous 
part of the reconstruction of information in memory.
Paris (.1965) likewise found that even his elementary 
school age subjects spontaneously constructed inferential rela­
tionships which were integrated in their memory representations 
of the story. This study revealed that comprehension is a con­
structive process, and that inference making is a constructive
process. Further evidence of this was found by Paris and Carter 
(1973) when they used a semantic integration paradigm similar to 
that used by Bransford and Franks. They presented brief stories 
to elementary age children and instructed them to remember the 
exact story. However, the children did not recall the stories 
exactly as they had heard them. The children had problems remem­
bering the exact words. Instead, they integrated information 
and drew inferential relationships during recall.
Other research indicates that inferences are made by 
adding information to the original messages. Several studies 
have found that when certain types of information are not expli­
citly stated, the subjects will infer the information when they 
are asked to recall the message. In one such study Paris and 
Lindauer (1976) read sentences to 7 and 11 year olds. The sen­
tences either implied or stated an instrument of action in a 
story. (An example of the statements used is "the workman dug 
a hole in the ground [with a shovel].") Even when the tool was 
not stated explicitly in the sentence (as in the non-parentheti- 
cal portion of the sample sentence) the children could 'remember' 
the tool used as well as if it had been named in the sentence.
Paris and Upton (1976) conducted a similar study which 
tested the production of contextual and lexical inferences. 
Lexical inferences were operationalized as remembrance of an 
implied tool while contextual inferences focused on "remembering" 
the consequences which were not stated in the stories. Their 
findings agree with those of Stein and Glenn (1979). Stein and
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Glenn found that 4 categories of information were most likely to 
be inferred in the recall of a story. The categories were major 
settings, initiating events, major goal statements, and conse­
quences. Paris and Upton's tools can be found in the initiating 
events category, and their consequence category is the same as 
Stein and Glenn's.
Kintsch (1972) reports similar findings. He presented 
his subjects with sentences like "The man was shot" and asked 
them to specify other information that was true of the statement. 
Most subjects indicated that the man had to be shot by something 
which was probably a gun. Thus, his subjects inferred an instru­
ment or tool which was part of the setting and used in initiating 
the event.
Johnson, Bransford, and Soloman (1973) supported Kintsch 
when they found that their subjects inferred instruments along 
with consequences when the actual information was missing from 
the story. Furthermore, Kintsch and Monk (1972) found that their 
subjects made similar inferences regardless of whether their 
stimulus material was presented in a simple or a complex manner.
All of the research discussed so far indicates that in­
ferences occur when information is either missing or is implied 
by a message. Another cause of inferences may be the presence 
of an inconsistency or contradiction in a message. Research 
indicates that when incoming stimuli are consistent with the 
expectations of the receiver, the information is assimilated and 
recalled with relative ease. When information is highly
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inconsistent with one's expectations, the information is 
rejected as not being valid. However, when information is 
only mildly inconsistent with expectations, the information is 
easily recalled in short term memory but tends to be converted 
to fit the expectations in long term recall (Taylor and Crocker, 
1980; Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1979). In other words, the pres­
ence of a mild inconsistency in a message will cause a receiver 
to make an inference in order to attain consistency. This 
information also implies that any message which is contradic­
tory to a receiver's expectations is subject to distortion by 
inference.
The inference research discussed in this section suggests 
that some relationships exist between the original message and 
the inferences which the subjects produced. If a group of 
related ideas was strung out over several sentences, the sub­
ject's memories very efficiently inferred the relationships 
between the parts. If certain information was implied but not 
stated, the subjects inferred a consistent version of the mes­
sage when they recalled the information.
In all of the studies discussed, subjects remembered the 
information which was presented as well as the inferences.
These results strongly point to the possibility that there is 
some interaction between the way the message is presented and 
the way it is remembered. To further explore this notion, the 
next section will focus on the way a message is presented and 
the interaction of that message with the semantic processing 
system.
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Story Structure and Schematic Processing
Story Structure
When a message * s sentences are put together to form a 
wholistic idea —  a story —  an underlying organization holds 
the sentences together. This underlying structure will be 
referred to as story structure or the idealized internal repre­
sentation of the parts of the story and the relationship among 
those parts (Mandler and Johnson, 1977). According to Handler 
and Johnson (1977) the structure of a story provides a framework 
for the comprehension of the ideas expressed in the story. This 
framework provides several functions.
1. It directs attention to certain aspects 
of incoming material.
2. It helps the listener keep track of what 
has gone before. In this capacity the 
story structure provides a summary that 
increases the predictability of what 
information will immediately follow.
3. It tells the listener when some part of 
the story is complete and can be stored, 
or is incomplete and must be held until 
more material is encoded.
The pioneer in the study of story structure was Bartlett
(1936). As he studied memory he tried to find some explanation
for the memory of prose information. He felt that "perceiving,
recognizing, and recalling were all functions which belong(ed)
to the same general series" of information processing (p. 187).
Bartlett's notion indicates that the original form of a message
as the receiver perceives it influences how the story will be
stored and recalled. Research seems to bear out this notion.
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Bartlett found that his subjects had a much easier time recalling 
stories that were presented in an organized format than stories 
that had little organization. This same finding has been 
repeated by others (Rumelhart, 1975; Mandler, 1978; Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977). In an effort to discover more about the struc­
ture of stories, researchers have developed grammars for stories 
which delineate the parts of a story (Rumelhart, 1975; Mandler,
1978; Mandler and Johnson, 1977). In order to establish a par­
ticular grammar, the researchers have used the folk tale as 
their model. Their rationale for using this material was that 
folk tales are handed down through the ages orally. The 
researchers felt that in order for these stories to be transmit­
ted as accurately as they have been, they must be highly structured.
Recently, however, research in this area has been expanded 
to include additional formats or structures. Mandler (1978) and 
Mandler and Johnson (1977) felt that some story grammars were 
incomplete and that some categories were artificial. In an 
attempt to correct these weaknesses, they expanded story grammar. 
They felt that a successful theory of story structure must pro­
vide a clear "parsing system which can be used to divide a story 
into structurally important units (p. 111)." This type of sys­
tem should also be able to predict which units tend to be remem­
bered and which units tend to be forgotten. The grammar that 
these researchers developed was geared for simple stories, or 
stories with only one protagonist in each episode. The story 
structure could also handle a limited amount of conversation if
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the emphasis was on the reactions of the protagonist. The story 
structure then represents the underlying structure of a story as 
a tree structure which designates the explicit constituent struc­
tures and the relationship between the constituent parts. An 
event which occurs in the story is an example of a constituent 
structure. That is, the story structure is concerned with un­
derlying information units not just surface structure sentences.
Using such an operationalization of grammar and story 
structure, Mandler and Johnson divided a story into two very 
general categories: the setting and the event structure. Each
category could be used to analyze the characters and events of 
the story. When Mandler and Johnson tested their grammar they 
found that stories which fit their grammar very closely were 
recalled in more detail and with more accuracy than stories that 
were not as closely structured. However, the structure of the 
original story and, as later research has shown, the one that is 
evident in the stories that are recalled did not seem to be the 
same (Tulving and Thomas, 1973; Rumelhart, 1976; Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977). The discrepancy between the two structures for 
the same story may contain part of the explanation for informa­
tion distortion which occurs in the inferential recall of infor­
mation. Mandler and Johnson (1977) believe that recall "comes 
to approximate the idealized [story structure] more than the 
actual form of the input (p. 112)." They feel that this shift 
to the ideal may occur because people can follow more twists and 
turns in incoming material and irregularities in information can
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be retained briefly in short term memory. Long term memory is 
not quite so flexible. They feel that memory tends to simplify 
information and make information conform to logical structures.
The story structure provides logical patterns for the informa­
tion.
Mandler and Johnson's (1977) analysis of their study 
showed strong support for the idea that well structured stories 
result in well structured recall. They found that fewer distor­
tions occur in the recall of stories that have strong structures. 
Their analysis also revealed that information distortion occurs 
in certain types of situations. The first type of situation 
occurs when an important part of the story structure is weak or 
missing. For example, if the protagonist's reaction to an action 
is missing, subjects tend to fill in (infer) the missing or 
unclear information. Another distortion occurs when a subject 
reverses the order of events in the story. This occurs when two 
similar nodes occur in the same story, e.g., two action sections. 
The final type of distortion that occurs is the addition of infor­
mation. This happens when the subjects elaborate upon something 
in the story. This type of distortion usually involves using 
more adjectives or adverbs as a subject describes a story. These 
findings were further verified by Mandler (1978) and Stein and 
Glenn (1979).
Even though story structure is used in both encoding and 
decoding a story, the rules may not be the same in both inci­
dences. This difference in the rules for the two story structures
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has led researchers to conclude that neither the amount encoded, 
nor the level of processing at which the information is received 
can predict recall (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977). Mandler and Johnson feel that recall is par­
tially a function of the goodness of the story structure itself, 
but they agree with Bartlett’s (1932) assertion that information 
is continuously being rearranged as new information is forth­
coming. Spiro (1977) found that incoming information does seem 
to influence the stored knowledge. He also found that incoming 
information is selectively remembered and affected by selective 
perception and context. He felt that the content includes pre­
existing information (or prior linguistic context) and the 
actual context of the situation.
The discussion of story structure indicates that the more 
highly a story is structured, the more accurately the story is 
recalled. However, the story structure does not remain static 
from input to recall. Evidence shows that some changes occur 
during the storage of the story in memory. In order to discover 
why and how these changes occur, notions of how information is 
stored in and retrieved from memory will not be examined.
Schematic Processing
The previous section discussed the structure of a story 
as it is used during the encoding process. The question that now 
arises is how the story structure interacts with the schematic 
processing system as an individual stores and recalls the infor­
mation. Some theories of memory postulate that information is
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stored in an orderly structured fashion somewhat similar to the 
story structure discussed in the previous section. Information 
that is related is stored together in a logical order. One 
such group of theories addresses the use of schema in memory.
Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1979) surveyed the various mem­
ory models which utilize the notion of schema and found that 
four elements are essential to any notion of schema:
1. A schema represents prototypical abstrac­
tion of the complex concepts it represents.
2. Schemata are induced from past experience 
with numerous exemplars of the complex 
concept it represents.
3. A schema can guide the organization of 
incoming information into clusters of know­
ledge that are "instantiations" of the schema.
4. When one of the constituent concepts of a 
schema is missing in the input, its features 
can be inferred from "default values" in the 
schema.
In general, Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth feel that a schema is an 
abstraction of a set of concepts and relationships that expli­
citly occur in a number of unique contexts. This abstraction 
of concepts and relationships provides a pattern for the indi­
vidual to use in encoding and decoding information. Note that 
this group of elements provides a pattern for the individual to 
use in encoding and decoding information so that the mind can 
more easily process it. The definition of schema can thus be 
summarized as data structures for representing generic concepts 
which are stored in memory as well as those structures used to 
put the story together for transmission (Rumelhart and Ortony,
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1977). Keeping this definition in mind, Rumelhart and Ortony 
(1977) found four characteristics of schema which qualify it 
as a means of representing knowledge in memory. The first 
characteristic is that schema has variables. Secondly, sche­
mata can embed one within the other. Thirdly, schemata repre­
sent generic concepts which vary in their levels of abstraction. 
The Æourth characteristic is that schemata represent knowledge 
areas and definitions. These four aspects seem to rationalize 
a schema's ability to cope with encoding and decoding informa­
tion. This is especially relevant in light of postulations 
about how information is processed in memory.
One example of such a notion about memory was postulated 
by Bobrow and Norman (1975). They theorized that the human 
mind is guided by a central, limited processor which utilizes 
schemata. They felt that three reasons justified this rea­
soning:
1. The central processor gives the system 
coherence. "Without purpose, the sys­
tem will fail to pursue a line of inquiry 
in any directed fashion." (p. 146)
2. The central processor controls the number 
of purposes thus minimizing confusion.
In other words there must be some type of 
"central motivational process" which can 
select among different purposes.
3. Some mechanism with access to all memory 
schemata must guide the interpretive 
process. This type is needed to know 
when a schema is filled out and to judge 
the goodness of fit between information 
and schema.
19
Bobrow and Norman felt that information was processed by using 
this central limited processor. They felt that the central 
processor is needed so that the system could respond to the 
environment in a rational, coherent manner. Based on infor­
mation available on how the human being functions, they felt 
that the central processor allocates the resources among the 
various functions of the system. However, the system is lim­
ited. First, the system is data-limited. This limitation 
occurs when quality of input confuses the mapping process.
Due to such confusion there may be some difficulty in mapping 
input into the memory structure. Secondly, the system is 
resource-limited. This limitation occurs when the mapping 
procedure is obstructed by lack of appropriate memory struc­
tures. When this limitation exists the demands may exceed the 
system's ability to cope.
Because the system is limited, it utilizes techniques 
which allow it to process information in the most efficient 
manner. The use of schemata is one such technique. Bobrow 
and Norman (1975) felt that their central processor utilized 
schemata in at least two situations. First, schemata are used 
when the system attempts to reduce any ambiguity or fill holes 
in an existing information category. In other words, schemata 
provide the guidelines for the system's search for the informa­
tion needed to complete a category so it can achieve closure. 
The system also utilizes schemata when it tries to associate 
new information with existing information categories. In this
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capacity, the schemata help the reader to be sensitive to 
novel information or help confirm or dispute hypothesis 
(Rumelhart, 1976).
The notion of a schematic processing system (a memory 
system using schemata) can easily be applied to the processing 
of linguistic information. Aaronson and Scarborough (1977) 
felt that an underlying structure exists into which incoming 
information is integrated. They felt that since evidence indi­
cated that chunking occurs in the recall of sentences, individ­
uals must be identifying, organizing, and integrating linguistic 
information. Their model suggests "that there is a level of 
linguistic processing at which words must be integrated into a 
larger context across phrase units (p. 301)." Schemata can 
provide the larger context.
Interaction of Story Structure and the Schematic Processing 
System
The schematic processing system is not static and 
changes so that new and old information can be integrated during 
information processing. Because the system does change to accom­
modate new information, or fit the new and old information 
together, inferences often become part of the information that 
is recalled.
When a story is presented to the schematic processing 
system, it has a structure of its own. If the structure is 
strong enough, the system integrates the story structure into 
the mind's system. If however, the story structure is weak or
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has missing or incongruent parts, the mind probably changes 
the story as it is complete or fits into an existing set of 
ideas or the schema. The distortion of the story results not 
only from the changes in the schema, but also because of the 
weaknesses in the original story structure. The difference 
between information at input and at recall has led some 
researchers to conclude that the original story structure can 
not predict the structure of the recalled version of the story.
The fundamental assumption of the schema theorist 
approach to language comprehension is that neither a spoken 
nor written, text carries the meaning itself —  the text only 
provides directions to the receivers as to how they should 
retrieve or construct the intended meaning from each individual's 
own previous knowledge (Adams and Collins, 1979). The words in 
a message and their organization help an individual remember 
past associations and inter-relationships. From this informa­
tion, the individual infers the meaning of the text. The deri­
vation of meaning from the text comes from two component proc­
esses: the application of prior knowledge and the making of
inferences (Bartlett, 1936; Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso,
1979). All of this occurs during schematic processing.
Summary, Research Questions and Hypotheses
The discussions of inferences, story structure, and 
schematic processing indicate that information distortion in 
the form of inferences can occur in several ways. The ideas 
in a group of related sentences are often combined by a reader
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and the underlying relationship is inferred. The individual 
seems to use that underlying relationship to aid recall and 
to make inferences. The inferences seem to occur when the 
structure of a story is either missing information or contains 
incongruent information. In these situations information 
seems to be either added or deleted from the original story.
The section on inferences and story structure indicated 
that the message itself partially influences the production of 
inferences. To arrive at this finding experimenters manipulated 
the presence or absence of structure and strong and weak struc­
tures. They also tested the result of explicitly stating infor­
mation and only implying information. None of the research 
seems to really focus on the inter-relationships of the parts 
of the story. That is, no one has manipulated the story from 
within. If this type of study was done, research might dis­
cover how story structure can cause different types of infer­
ences.
At this point research should address the notion that 
manipulating story structure can affect the inferences that are 
produced during recall. If a story structure does interact 
with a story schemata, manipulations of story structure should 
produce corresponding differences in recall. If research can 
produce a better way of studying that interaction, it should 
be able to address the question of the effect of story struc­
ture on inference making.
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Before the question can be addressed, story structure 
needs to be broken down into some workable elements which 
could correspond to a story schemata. By examining the struc­
ture of recalled stories and comparing stories which are 
remembered with those that are not remembered clearly, 
researchers have been able to determine what elements are most 
important in story structure (Freedle and Hale, 1979; Stein and 
Glenn, 1979; and Handler and Johnson, 1977). These elements 
are a setting, a goal, a beginning, a simple reaction, an 
attempt, an outcome, and an ending. Paris and Upton(1971) 
found that several of these categories could effectively be 
collapsed into two general categories, cause and consequence. 
The cause category included any goals and attempts in a story. 
Reactions, outcomes, and endings were put into the consequence 
category. Handler and Johnson (1977) also found the elements 
could be collapsed into general categories. Their categories 
were setting and event. They placed any information other than 
background information (setting) into the event category; 
included in the event were causes, the actual action in the 
story, and any outcomes and reactions.
As long as the above categories of information or nodes 
were present in a story, the story was easily recalled. How­
ever, stories that could not be parsed into some version, 
either general or specific, of these categories were not remem­
bered very well (Bartlett, 1932 and Handler, 197 8). This sug­
gests that overall story structure has a strong influence on 
whether information is remembered.
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Although most research to date has addressed the over­
all effect of the presence of story structure on recall, some 
has focused a bit on the manipulation of story structure.
This research however, has addressed the filling in of missing 
data as the schematic processing system seeks closure by filling 
missing portions of the schema. Research, to date, has not 
addressed the question of how the manipulation of one part of 
story structure influences the recall of the rest of the story.
Still another question which arises is whether one part 
of a story (a node) is more important than other parts of the 
story structure in cuing the accurate recall of a story. If 
so, the manipulation of that node should effect the inferences 
made in recall. Handler and Johnson (1977) found that their 
subjects did have more difficulty recalling endings and reac­
tions (consequences) in stories than the other nodes. This 
finding suggests that the consequence node is not as important 
to recall as some other story nodes.
Another issue which needs to be addressed is what hap­
pens when all the story nodes are present but are not congruent 
with each other. Research done by Taylor and Crocker (1980) 
shows that when individuals perceive someone and hear something 
about the individual which is inconsistent with their percep­
tions, the perceivers tend to either forget the incongruent 
information or revise the incongruent information so that all 
the information recalled is congruent. This same type of 
phenomenon could also occur during the perception of other forms 
of information such as stories.
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Three questions, then, develop from the discussion of 
whether story structure can be manipulated to produce infer­
ences.
(A) Will the deletion of a story node cause inferences 
about the rest of the story as well as the missing node? The 
research discussed in this chapter has established the impor­
tance of good story structure for the accurate recall of a 
story. If the structure of a story is manipulated so that one 
node is missing, subjects will probably do one of two things 
when they recall the story. They might simply fill in, or 
infer, the missing information and accurately remember the rest 
of the story, or subjects might make inferences in several story 
nodes as they try to fill in the missing link in the story struc­
ture. In either case the inference(s) would occur as the sub­
jects attempt to fit the story into their own "larger story 
schema." During the process of recalling the story, the pro­
duction of one inferred story node might cause subjects to make 
inferences in other parts of the story as they attempt to make 
that story fit the "larger schema."
(B) Will the manipulation of one node create more infer­
ences than the manipulation of other nodes in the same story? 
Although most of the research about story structure has been 
concerned with the effect of the presence or absence of a story 
structure, some research has suggested that the cause node is 
the most important node and the consequence node is the second 
in importance. If these two nodes are the cornerstones of
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story structure which cue memory, it seems that the manipula­
tion of these two nodes, particularly the cause node, could 
cause subjects to make other story nodes fit the manipulated 
cause or consequence node.
(C) Will an incongruency in the story cause inferences? 
According to the sources discussed in this chapter, all of the 
parts of a good story structure fit logically together. When 
story structure is a little disjointed, the story is difficult 
to remember. Person perception research indicates that when 
one aspect of another is incongruent with everything else a 
perceiver knows about that individual, the perceiver tends to 
forget the incongruent information. Likewise, if one element 
of a story does not fit logically with the rest of the story 
(it is incongruent) a receiver could very possibly forget the 
incongruent story node and make an inference which would fit 
logically with the rest of the story.
H^: More inferences will be produced in the recall of
a story missing the cause node than in the recall 
of an unaltered story.
^la* More cause nodes will be inferred when the 
cause node is deleted than when it is pre­
sented.
The deletion of the cause node will produce 
more inferences in the recall of all story 
nodes than the recall of an unaltered story.
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H2 : More inferences will be produced in the recall of
a story missing the consequence node than in the 
recall of an unaltered story.
More consequence nodes will be inferred when 
the node is deleted than when it is present. 
^2b" The deletion of the consequence node will
produce more inferences in the recall of all 
story nodes than the recall of an unaltered 
story.
More inferences will be produced when the cause 
node is deleted than when the consequence node is 
deleted.
More inferences will be produced in the recall of 
a story when one node is incongruent than when all 
story nodes are congruent.
Hg: There will be no significant difference in confi­
dence scores when subjects recall either inferences 
or information presented in the message.
^5a* There will be no significant difference in 
confidence scores when subjects infer the 
cause node or recall a cause node presented 
in the message.
There will be no significant difference in 
confidence scores when subjects infer the 
consequence node or recall a consequence node 
presented in the message.
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There will be no significant difference in 
confidence scores when subjects infer a con­
gruent conclusion or recall a congruent con­




The testing of the hypotheses presented in Chapter I was 
accomplished by using 152 subjects from eight sections of Com­
munication 1113 at the University of Oklahoma. Since the Com­
munication 1113 course is open to students from all majors at 
the university the subjects are assumed to be representative of 
the general student population.
Design
The research design used in this study contained one 
independent variable and three dependent variables cast into a 
one-way, four group comparison. Story structure, the independent 
variable, was manipulated to create four conditions; unaltered 
story structure (UA), cause deleted story structure (CA), conse­
quence deleted story structure (CQ), and incongruent story struc­
ture (IC). The dependent variables were the recall of the cause, 
the recall of the consequence, and the recall of the incongruency.
Stimulus Material
The discussion in Chapter I established the presence of 
certain story nodes in an individual's story schema. The four
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most basic nodes established in the previous discussion were 
background, cause, event, and consequence. Therefore, these 
four nodes were used to parse the three communication case 
studies which were used as stimulus material in this experi­
ment. (All stimulus stories can be seen in Appendix A.)
The parsing of the stimulus material into the four nodes 
made the manipulation of different parts of the story structure 
possible. This type of manipulation was essential for testing 
the research questions and the hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter.
To be certain that the parsing of the stimulus material 
was compatible with the expectations of an individual's story 
schema, several stages were involved in the parsing of the case 
studies. After the experimenter had written the stories to fit 
the fourth node structure, the stories were submitted to a panel 
of raters to validate the parsing. All of the raters involved 
in the validating procedure were graduate students in either 
Business or Communication. None of the judges were familiar 
with the experimenter's research so her expectations did not 
bias the way the raters judged the parsing of the stories.
During the judging process, each rater received a packet 
which contained the definitions of the nodes as well as a copy 
of all three case studies. The background was defined as 
information providing the setting of the story. The cause was 
defined as the reason the action occurs and the event was the 
main action occurring in the story line. The fourth node.
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consequence, was defined as the result of the event. After 
they had read the definitions, the raters were asked to read 
each story and parse each of them into the four nodes. The 
criterion for acceptance, which had been previously set, was 
that at least 4 of 5 judges must agree.
The criterion was met the first time by two of the three 
stories. Both the "Big Bite" and "Communicate or Perish" were 
easily parsed into the designated categories by the required 4
of 5 judges. The third story, "Nick's Crisis," had to be
revised and the parsing revalidated by a new group of 5 judges 
who were also graduate students in either Business or Communi­
cation. The four story nodes were accurately identified by 4 
of the 5 judges who read the revised version.
A separate validation procedure was used to validate the
incongruent version of the stories which were used to test the 
third hypothesis. The validators used in this phase of the 
study were more graduate students in Communication or Business. 
Two criteria had to be met before a judge was chosen. First, 
the judge could not have participated in the parsing of the 
stories. This criterion prevented the possibility of someone 
being familiar with the congruent version of the story. The 
second criterion was that, once again, the validators could not 
be familiar with the researcher's study so her expectations 
would not bias their judgement. Three judges who met the cri­
teria were chosen for this phase.
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The judges were presented a packet which contained the 
definition of an incongruency and a copy of the incongruent 
version of the three stories. Incongruency was defined for 
the raters as the part(s) of the story that does (do) not fit 
together logically. The raters were asked to read each story 
and indicate if any portion of the story fit the definition 
of incongruency. The criterion for acceptance was set at 2 of 
3 judges being in agreement. This criterion was exceeded in 
the validation of the incongruent version of the "Big Bite" 
and "Communicate or Perish." Once again, "Nick's Crisis" 
failed to be validated. The incongruent consequence node was 
revised and submitted to a new set of three judges. The 
revised version was validated when two of the three judges 
agreed that the node was incongruent with the rest of the story.
Dependent Measure
The dependent measure used in this study was a multiple- 
choice questionnaire which was structured so that at least one 
question addressed each story node which was manipulated, as 
well as one of the other nodes, either the background or the 
event. (See Appendix B.) Four categories of questions were 
used on the questionnaire for each study: cause, consequence,
congruity, and the filler. All four types of questions were 
presented for each story. The cause question addressed the 
cause node of the story; the consequence, the consequence node; 
and the congruity question, the portion of the story that was
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incongruent in the IC condition. The filler question was 
directed toward either the background or the event node of the 
stories. Following each question was a confidence scale. The 
scale ranged from 1 (little confidence) to 5 (very confident). 
The subjects were asked to indicate the degree of confidence 
they felt about their responses to each question in the ques­
tionnaire.
Each question had four possible responses. The responses 
included three content related choices plus a fourth choice,
"(d) the story doesn't say." Each question had only one cor­
rect response. The correct answer, of course, depended on 
which group the respondent was in. In the CA and CQ conditions, 
the fourth choice or "(d)" was the correct response to the ques­
tions about the cause and consequence nodes respectively. In 
all other cases, the choice of "(d)" was considered as an indi­
cation that the subject could not remember the information.
In these situations, "(d)" was not considered as either correct 
or incorrect. All incorrect responses were considered to be 
inferences.
A pretest was conducted to check the quality of the ques­
tions. During the pretest, the experimenter read the unaltered 
version of the case studies to 120 students enrolled in 4 sec­
tions of Business Communication 3113. The order of presentation 
of the stories was randomized in each class to control for order 
effects. An item analysis confirmed the effectiveness of the 
questions over two of the case studies, "The Big Bite" and
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''Communicate or Perish." The percentage of correct responses 
ranged from 64% to 92%. (A 60% criterion had been previously 
determined for acceptability). Unfortunately, the questions 
over the third story, "Nick's Crisis," did not fare as well. 
Only one question was judged acceptable at 67%. Therefore, 
the questions over this story were revised and tested again 
using another section of 3113. This time the percentage of 
correct responses to all four questions were all over the 60% 
mark.
Procedure
All stimulus material used in this study was recorded 
on video tape. The same presenter, a professional radio and 
television announcer, recorded all the messages. The use of 
video tapes insured that no variances existed in the manner in 
which the material was presented across the classes. That is, 
the two classes who composed a group heard exactly the same 
material, thus eliminating any variance caused by possible dif­
ferences in presentation. The use of the same source on all 
of the tapes also controlled any variance which might have been 
caused by the source. For example, any difference in response 
to the perceived credibility or appearance of different sources 
was minimized by using only one source.
Each of the Communication 1113 sections was assigned to 
one of four experimental groups. Each group was comprised of 
two classes occurring at different times of day. Two time per­
iods were used to minimize any variance caused by Type G error
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or errors caused by extraneous variation between groups. Each 
group heard one set of stimulus material. That is, the first 
group (CA) heard stories from which the cause node had been 
deleted. The consequence node was deleted from the set of 
stories presented to the second group (CQ). The third group 
(IC) heard stories which contained an incongruous consequence 
node. The fourth group (UA) heard stories which had not been 
altered.
The study was done over two class periods. The classes 
ranged in size from 14 to 23 students. A student had to be 
present during both class periods in order to qualify as a sub­
ject. On the first day the experimenter went into class and 
told the students that she wanted them to watch and listen to 
some communication case studies on the TV monitor in the room. 
The students were told that the experimenter could not discuss 
the case studies that day, but would return the next class per­
iod to ask some questions and discuss the cases with them.
The experimenter returned the next class meeting and distributed 
the test packet which included four questions over each case 
study. The same questionnaire was administered to all classes. 
The subjects were told that answering the questions was volun­
tary. Only nine students chose not to cooperate. The subjects 
that chose not to participate were randomly scattered through­
out the eight classes.
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. Statistical Analysis 
The data gathered in this study were coded into infer­
ence scores and recall scores. Inference scores were the num­
ber of inferential responses, or incorrect answers, each sub­
ject made summed across all three stories. These scores were 
computed for the cause, the consequence, and the congruency 
questions. Each subject could have an inference score ranging 
from 0 to 3 for each of the dependent variables. Likewise, 
the recall scores were the number of correct responses each 
subject made summed across all three stories. These scores 
were also computed for each of the three questions and each 
subject’s recall score could range from 0 to 3.
After the data were coded into the two categories, both 
sets of scores were submitted to a series of Hotelling's T 
Squares (Winer, 1979). The Hotelling's statistic is a multi­
variate analog of the Student's t-test. The statistic provides 
a test of the differences between two means. The UA group's 
inference and recall scores served as a baseline against which 
the other groups' scores were compared. If the Hotelling's 
statistic produced a significant F value (an alpha level of .05 
or better). Student's t-tests were performed to determine where 
the differences existed.
The confidence scores were also submitted to the Hotel­
ling's T Square statistic. Once again, if a significant F 
value was produced. Student's t-tests were performed to explore 
the differences between the groups.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
The results of the data analysis discussed in the previous 
chapter are presented in this chapter. However, prior to con­
ducting the statistical analysis, a determination had to be made 
concerning whether the data could be treated as interval level 
data. The data were first coded as correct (1) or incorrect (0) 
for all questions of all three stories across all 4 conditions.
At that point the data were only dichotomous. If, however, the 
data could be collapsed across all three stories, the data could 
be treated as interval level with a range of 0 to 3 for the 
recall score (correct responses) and 0 to 3 for the inference 
scores (incorrect responses excluding "(d) story doesn't say") 
for each dependent measure.
In order to determine if the data from all three stories 
could be combined, an item analysis was performed on the ques­
tionnaire. The recall scores, number of correct responses, were 
computed for the UA group. The mean percentage of correct 
responses are shown in Table 1. These figures indicate several 
things about the instrument as well as the data. First, the 
questionnaire showed an acceptable degree of difficulty. The 
percentage of correct responses ranged from 64% to 74%. If the
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questions had been too difficult the scores would have been 
much lower. Conversely, if the items had been too easy, the 
scores would have been much higher. The small range between 
the scores showed that the performance was comparable across 
all three stories and the data could therefore be collapsed 
together and treated as interval level data.
Table 1 
Correct Responses
Story Nick C or P Bite
Mean
Recall (%) 69 64 74
Standard
Deviation (%) 11.4 11.8 5.1
The data used in the above analysis, as well as the sta­
tistical analysis discussed in the rest of this chapter, used 
only the responses to the cause, the consequence, and the con­
gruent questions. The filler questions were not used in the 
data analysis since they did not address any manipulated por­
tion of the stories nor did they address any one specific node 
as did the other three questions.
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General Findings
The results of the experiment may be seen in Tables 2,
3, and 4 which show the mean inference scores, the mean recall 
scores, and the mean confidence scores, respectively. The 
data presented for the UA group in all three tables was used 
as a baseline against which all other groups were compared 
during the data analysis. A brief overview of the means shows 
that the cause, the consequence and the congruency manipula­
tions all affected the number of inferences made as well as 
the accuracy of the recall of the story nodes. As Table 2 
shows, the CA group made an average of 2.48 inferences while 
the UA group made an average of only 0.73 inferences on the 
cause question. Likewise, the CQ group averaged 1.69 infer­
ences and the UA group only 0.67 on the consequence question. 
The IC group also made more inferences than the UA group by 
averaging 1.33 inferences in response to the congruency ques­
tion compared to 0.73 average inferences for the UA group. As 
the following discussion of the hypothesized findings show, 
these differences all produced alpha levels which met or 
exceeded the .05 acceptability criterion, thus supporting the 
first three hypotheses.
Unfortunately, the mean confidence scores, shown in 
Table 4, also varied across the groups instead of remaining 
consistent as had been hypothesized. The UA group expressed 
an average confidence score of 10.94 compared to the 9.76 aver­
age reported by the CA group about their responses to the cause
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Table 2
Inference Scores: Group Means






Cause .73 2.48 .67 . 60
Consequence .67 .58 1.69 1.33
Congruent .47 .85 1.07 .79
UA = Unaltered 
CA = Cause deleted 




Recall Scores: Group Means






Cause 1.97 . 52 1.83 2.02
Consequence 2.03 2.18 1.26 .95
Congruent 2.09 1.79 1.93 1.86
UA = Unaltered 
CA = Cause deleted 










Cause 10.94 9.76 10.26 10.72
Consequence 10.24 10.03 8.48 8.63
Congruent 9.79 9.61 8.38 10.58
UA = Unaltered 
CA = Cause deleted 
CQ = Consequence deleted 
IC = Incongruent
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question. The CQ group, likewise, reported a confidence score 
of 8.48 which was lower than the mean score of 10.24 reported 
by the UA group about their responses to the consequence ques­
tion. The IC group also seemed less confident in their 
responses to the consequence question, averaging a confidence 
score of 8.38 compared to the score of 9.79 for the UA group. 
However, the IC group reported a slightly higher confidence 
score for the congruency question than did the UA group, 10.58 
compared to 9.79. Although the scores did not remain consis­
tent across all four conditions, all of the differences were 
not statistically significant. The ones that were and were not 
will be discussed further in this chapter. An examination of 
the data by hypothesis will more clearly show which hypotheses 
were supported and which were not.
Hypothesized Findings 
The discussion in Chapter 1 suggested five hypotheses 
for testing. A summary of the data analysis for each hypothe­
sis is presented on Table 8 at the end of this chapter. The 
first hypothesis speculated that more inferences would be pro­
duced in recall when the cause node was deleted than when it 
was present. The hypothesis was further broken down to specu­
late that the inferences would occur in the recall of the cause 
node (H^^) as well as in all other nodes (H^^). A Hotelling's 
T Square (Winer, 1979) showed that the CA group did make more 
overall inferences than did the UA group (F=38.69; p<.0004).
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In order to find if the difference was caused by the experi­
mental manipulation, a series of Student's t-tests were per­
formed on each dependent variable (see Table 5). Significant 
t values were produced when the inference scores for the cause 
and the congruency questions each were compared. The CA group 
made significantly more cause (t=10.29; p<.04) and congruency 
(t=2.02; p<.047) inferences than did the UA group, thus sup­
porting the first hypothesis. The analysis of the recall 
scores also supported the above results.
The Hotelling's T Square was also performed on the 
recall scores for the UA and CA groups (see Table 6). If the 
forgetting option did not significantly distort the data, the 
results should be the inverse of the testing of the inference 
scores. The results showed that the UA group did indeed make 
a higher recall score than did the CA group (F=29.48; p<.0004). 
That is, the UA group more accurately recalled the information. 
This finding further supports the first hypothesis that the 
deletion of the cause node will produce inferences in recall.
The second hypothesis postulated that the deletion of 
the consequence node would produce inferences in recall. This 
hypothesis was also subdivided into two parts. The two parts 
speculated that the inferences would occur in the recall of 
the consequence node as well as all other nodes (Hg^)•
Hotelling's T Squares were performed on both the mean recall 
and the mean inference scores (see Tables 5 and 6) for the UA 
and CQ groups. A significant F value was produced by both
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Table 5
Hotelling's T Tests on Inference Scores














Cause t t=10.29 64 .04


































Cause t t= -.73 74 NS




















Congruent t t=-1.02 73 NS
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Table 6
Hotelling's T Square on Recall Scores














Cause t t=-7.67 65 .004


































Cause t t= .27 75 NS




















Congruent t t= -.63 73 NS
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Hotelling's statistics, thereby showing significant differ­
ences in both the number of inferences as well as the number 
of correct responses made by the two groups. The CQ group 
made significantly more inferences than did the UA group 
(F=8.21; p<.0004). Conversely, the UA group more accurately 
recalled the stories than did the CQ group (F=4.40; p<.007).
The results therefore, support the notion that the deletion of 
the consequence node will produce inferences in recall.
The t-tests on the individual dependent variables showed 
that the CQ group made more inferences in response to the con­
sequence (t=4.62; p<.0004) and the congruency (t=2.89; p<.005) 
questions. The t-tests run on the recall scores revealed that 
the UA group made a higher recall score on the consequence 
question (t=-3.39; p<.001). However, the t-tests revealed no 
significant statistical difference on the recall scores to the 
congruency question thus suggesting that the subjects used the 
"(d)" option. The choice of "(d) the story doesn't say" indi­
cated that the subject had forgotten the answer. According to 
the hypothesis, the CA group would make more inferences in 
recall than the CQ group. A Hotelling's T Square (see Table 5) 
computed between the mean inference scores of the two groups 
produced an F value of 52.45 which was significant at the .0004 
level (df=3.71). The t-tests showed that the difference was 
caused by the greater number of cause inferences made by the 
CA group (,t=9.48; p<.0004). The results, then, support the
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notion that the effect of cause deletion on inference making 
in recall is stronger than the effect of consequence deletion.
The Hotelling's T statistic run on the mean recall 
scores of the CA and CQ groups also produced a significant F 
value CF=29.67; p<.0004). The t-tests revealed that the CQ 
group more accurately recalled the cause node (t=7.43; p<.0004). 
These results suggest that the choice of the forgetting option 
did not affect the data.
The inference scores of the IC and UA groups were com­
pared in testing the fourth hypothesis. A Hotelling's T Square 
(see Table 5) between the mean inference scores of the two 
groups produced an F value of 6.29 (p<.001). Therefore, the 
results indicated that the presence of an incongruity produced 
more inferences than when no incongruity was present. The t- 
tests revealed that the differences occurred in the responses 
to the consequence (t=3.37; p<.001) and the congruency (t=l.99; 
p<.05) questions. Once again, the statistics performed on the 
mean recall scores revealed no forgetting effect. The Hotel­
ling's T produced a significant F value of 12.53 (p<.0004).
The t-tests revealed that the UA group more accurately recalled 
the consequence node (t=-5.93; p<.0004). Therefore, the 
results indicate that the presence of an incongruity produced 
more inferences than when no incongruity was present as hypoth­
esized.
The final hypothesis speculated that inferences would 
be made with equal confidence as the recall of any other
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information. Because this hypothesis is stated in the null 
form certain concerns must be addressed. These concerns are 
different than the ones governing the testing of a regular 
statistical hypothesis. Situations, like the present one, in 
which the rationale supports the null and the statistics are 
set up to reject the null are controversial. However, certain 
guidelines have been established which allow one to cope with 
testing the null in a fairer way. These guidelines were estab­
lished by Fisher (1949), Neyman and Pearson (1928) and Binder 
(1963).
According to the guidelines discussed by Binder (1963), 
a researcher can, after considering the N size and the power 
of the statistic, set a more conservative (more conservative 
in testing the null) alpha level. The conservative alpha level 
increases the likelihood of rejecting the null, thus places 
more stringent limitations on "accepting" the null. Following 
Binder's guidelines, the alpha for testing H^, was set at .20. 
The actual difference between means that were significant at 
the .05 alpha are not especially large in terms of actual value. 
The .20 alpha quadruples the alpha level, thus reducing the 
possibility of falsely "accepting" the null hypothesis. The 
.20 alpha will, therefore, make it more difficult to support 
the hypothesis.
To test the fifth hypothesis, three Hotelling's T Squares 
were run to compare the confidence scores (see Table 7) of the 
different groups. The first Hotelling's statistic compared the
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Table 7
Hotelling's T Square on Confidence Scores
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Congruent t t= 2.01 73 0.048*
Significant
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confidence scores of the CA and the UA groups. The P value of 
this statistic was significant at the .045 level. The t-tests 
revealed that the significance was most likely caused by the 
confidence scores on the cause question (t=-1.61; p<.112).
This finding, then, casts doubt on the hypothesized notion that 
the CA group would be just as confident as the UA group. 
According to the test results, the CA group was less confident 
in their cause answers than were the UA group.
The Hotelling's T comparing the CQ and UA groups also 
produced a significant F value (F=2.77; p<.048). Once again, 
the t-tests also produced significant results between the two 
groups on their confidence scores on the consequence (t=-2.46; 
p<.015) and the congruent variables (t=-2.02; p<.047). These 
results were contrary to those predicted by the hypothesis.
The CQ group expressed significantly less confidence in their 
answers than did the UA group.
The third Hotelling's statistic compared the IC and UA 
groups. Once again the F value was significant (p<.0004). The 
t-tests revealed that the differences between the two groups 
were caused by differences in confidence expressed over the 
responses to the consequence (t=-2.46; p<.016) question only.
No significant difference existed in the confidence expressed 
on the answers to the congruency question which addressed the 




A brief overview of the results presented in this chap­
ter show that the first four hypotheses were supported. As 
suggested by more inferences were produced when the cause 
node was deleted than when it was present in a story. More 
inferences were also produced when the consequence node was 
deleted as stated in the second hypothesis. However, the 
effect of the cause deletion appeared to be stronger than the 
effect of consequence deletion on the production of inferences 
in recall as suggested by H^. Another story structure manipu­
lation which produced inferences in recall was the presence of 
an incongruity in a story. This finding supported the fourth 
hypothesis.
Results from the fifth hypothesis found a few signifi­
cant differences in the confidence scores between the groups. 
More specifically, the CQ and CA groups expressed significantly 
less confidence in their consequence and cause responses, 
respectively, than did the UA group. These results along with 




Results of Hypothesis Testing
Groups Hypo Variables Type Test Test Value d.f. P Value
Cause deleted 1 All Inf. Hotelling's T F=38.69 3,63 .0004
vs
Unaltered "a RCA t t=-7 .67 65 .0004
ICA t t=10.29 64 .04
lb All Inf. Hotelling's T F=38.69 3,61 .0004
Consequence 2 All Inf. Hotelling's T F= 8.21 3,72 .0004
deleted
vs 2g RCQ t t=-3.39 74 .001
Unaltered
ICQ t t= 4.62 73 .0004
2b All Inf. Hotelling's T F= 8.21 3,70 .0004








Cause deleted Sg All Inf. Hotelling's T F= 2.81 3,63 ,045vs
Unaltered CCA t t=-l.61 65 .112
Consequence 5% All Inf. Hotelling's T F= 2.81 3,72 .048deleted
vs CCQ t t=02.48 74 .015
Unaltered
Incongruent 5c All Inf. Hotelling's T F=10.77 3,72 .0004vs
Unaltered CIC t t= 1.88 75 NS
RCA = recall of cause CCA = confidence for cause
ICA = inference of cause 
RCQ = recall of consequence 
ICQ = inference of consequence
CCQ = confidence for consequence 
CIC = confidence for congruency
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
This study has centered around the rationale presented 
in the first chapter. That rationale resulted in the proposal 
of five hypotheses which were tested by the methodology presented 
in the second chapter. The results of the testing were then 
discussed in the third chapter. This fourth chapter will now 
interpret those results in light of the research questions and 
hypotheses presented in the first chapter.
The discussion will be divided into three topic areas 
which correspond to the type of experimental manipulations sug­
gested by the hypotheses. These areas include a discussion of 
the hypothesized findings which is divided into the effect of 
the deletion of story nodes, the effect of an incongruent story 
node, and the level of confidence expressed by the subjects in 
the different story structure conditions. In addition to the 
discussion of the results, some suggestions for future research 
and a summary of the study are included in this chapter.
Discussion of Hypothesized Findings
Deletion of Story Mode
Three hypotheses in this study addressed the effect of
story node deletion. These hypotheses addressed the effect of
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the deletion of the cause and consequence nodes in a story which, 
according to some of the sources mentioned in the first chapter, 
are the most important nodes in a story. The data discussed in 
the previous chapter suggests strong effects on the recall of 
stories when either the cause or consequence nodes are deleted. 
However, both hypotheses were subdivided to express more specific 
effects of node deletion.
The first hypothesis and its subdivisions were stated as: 
H^: More inferences will be produced in the recall of
a story missing the cause node than in the recall 
of an unaltered story.
^la* cause nodes will be inferred when the
cause node is deleted than when it is present. 
The deletion of the cause node will produce 
more inferences in the recall of all story 
nodes than the recall of an unaltered story.
As predicted in the hypothesis, the cause deletion manip­
ulation produced a significant overall effect on the recall of 
the stimulus material. The Hotelling's T Square indicated that 
the CA group made a significantly greater mean number of infer­
ences in the recall of the stories than did the UA group, thus 
supporting the overall hypothesis. A t-test between the infer­
ence scores of the cause question for the two groups validated 
H^^ (t=10.29; p<.04). Significantly more cause nodes were 
inferred by the CA group than the UA group. This suggests that 
the CA group chose to make an inference to fill in the missing
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data instead of remembering that the story did not have a 
cause node. In other words, the subjects' story schemata 
seemed to have affected the way the group recalled the stor­
ies. This finding thus supports the notion that the receivers' 
schemata interacted with the stories' structures to influence 
recall.
The second component of the hypothesis speculated that 
the deletion of the cause node would make subjects produce 
inferences in other story nodes. The t-tests did not com­
pletely support this notion. The CA group did make more infer­
ences in response to the congruency question (t=2.02; p<.047); 
however, the group did not make more inferences in response to 
the consequence question. The results were puzzling since 
both questions addressed the same node. However, the possible 
choices available to the subjects were not identical. The cor­
rect answer to the congruency questions, on the other hand, 
were similar to, but did not correspond exactly to the wording 
in the story. The difference in the wording of the answers 
may have caused the difference in responses to the two ques­
tions over the same node. However, this effect did not occur 
in any other experimental condition. Therefore, the absence 
of the cause node may have influenced the subjects as they 
recalled the rest of the story as the hypothesis suggests.
The analysis of the first hypothesis supported the sug­
gestion presented in the first chapter that the cause node is 
a very important part of an individual's story schema. When a
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story does not have a cause, individuals infer the cause so 
that the story fits the expectations in their schema. The 
data analysis also supported the notion that the manipulation 
of the cause would affect how individuals recall the other 
nodes of a story. This finding suggests that a person's 
schema may use the cause node as the basis for establishing 
expectations for other story nodes. This idea, however, needs 
to be further explored in future research.
The second hypothesis addressed the effect of the dele­
tion of the consequence node. The second hypothesis and its 
two components were stated as:
More inferences will be produced in the recall of 
a story missing the consequence node than in the 
recall of an unaltered story.
'^2a' More consequence nodes will be inferred when 
the node is deleted than when it is present. 
^2b* deletion of the consequence node will
produce more inferences in the recall of all 
story nodes than the recall of an unaltered 
story,
A Hotelling's T Square showed that the CQ group did make 
significantly more inferences than did the UA group. Individ­
ual t-tests revealed that the difference between the groups 
was caused by the greater number of consequence (t=3.47; p<.001) 
and congruency (t=4.62; p<.0004) inferences made by the CQ 
group. This finding then, supports which suggests that
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subjects use their schemata to infer missing information 
instead of remembering that the information was actually 
missing.
The second component of the hypothesis speculated that 
the deletion of a consequence would produce more inferences 
in all story nodes. The only other node tapped by the ques­
tionnaire was the cause. The t-test revealed no significant 
difference in the number of inferences made by either group 
in response to the cause question. Therefore, at this time 
the hypothesis can not be confirmed.
The results of the testing of the first two hypotheses 
support the notion presented in Chapter I that an individual 
will infer data which is missing in a story. The findings sup­
port the notion that an individual will attempt to achieve men­
tal closure of information by filling in any gaps in that 
information. The data analysis also lends credence to the 
idea that the receiver’s expectations about a story, or the 
schema, will help the person make the incoming message fit the 
expectations established in the schema. Individuals expect a 
story to have a cause and a consequence, so when the parts are 
missing, subjects fill in the missing data with an inference. 
This finding implies that some interaction takes place between 
the message structure and schema as suggested in the rationale. 
The structure of the stimulus material used in this study 
seemed to have influenced how the receivers recalled the mes­
sages from their memory systems. That is, the interaction of
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the story structure and the subjects' schemata influenced how 
the subjects recalled the message, either accurately or dis­
torted.
The results of the testing did not, however, verify the 
idea that the deletion of one node will affect the recall of 
the other story nodes as speculated by the hypothesis. The 
lack of significance of these results may have been caused by 
the abbreviated nature of the instrument which did not tap the 
background and event nodes for analysis. The deletion of the 
cause node did, however, seem to effect the answers to one of 
the questions over the consequence node, while the deletion of 
the consequence did not seem to affect the recall of the cause. 
The difference in the effect of the two node manipulations 
lends support to the notion that the cause node is the most 
important one in a story.
Research by Paris (1965) and Handler and Johnson (1977), 
discussed in the first chapter, suggested that although both 
the cause and consequence nodes are essential for the accurate
recall of a story, the cause node is the more important of the 
two. The third hypothesis of this study addressed this specu­
lation in this manner;
H^; More inferences will be produced when the cause
node is deleted than when the consequence node is 
deleted.
A Hotelling's T Square conformed the speculation that the CA 
group would produce a larger mean number of inferences than the
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CQ group (see Table 7). The t-tests comparing the individual 
dependent variables revealed that the CQ group made more con­
sequence inferences (t=-5.52; p<.0004) and the CA group made 
more cause inferences (t=9.48; p<.0004). In other words, both 
groups inferred the missing node instead of remembering that 
the information was not present in the story. However, the 
effect of the cause deletion seemed to be greater than the 
effect of the consequence deletion causing the CA group to pro­
duce more inferences than the CQ group. That is, more cause 
inferences were made than consequence inferences when the 
respective nodes were missing. Therefore, the findings support 
the hypothesis that the deletion of the cause will generate 
more inferences than the deletion of the consequence node; thus, 
supporting the idea that the receivers' schemata have stronger 
expectations for a cause node than a consequence node.
Incongruent Story Node
The second type of story structure manipulation sug­
gested in Chapter I was the manipulation of the consequence to 
make it incongruent with the rest of the story. Research pre­
sented in the first chapter by Taylor and Crocker (1980) and 
Kintsch and Van Dijk (1979) suggested that when an incongruity 
exists in the incoming stimulus, the receiver will make an 
inference during memory in an attempt to make all of the infor­
mation congruent. The fourth hypothesis addressed this effect 
as it relates to story structure:
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More inferences will be produced in the recall of 
a story when one node is incongruent than when 
all story nodes are congruent.
The data on the mean number of inferences made by the IC and 
UA groups showed that the IC group did indeed make more infer­
ences (F-6.29; p<.001) thus supporting the hypothesis. A ser­
ies of t-tests were performed on each of the dependent varia­
bles. These statistics revealed that the IC group made more 
consequence inferences (t=3.37; p<.001) as well as more con­
gruency inferences (t=1.99; p<.05). Since both questions 
addressed the incongruent node, the subjects were consistent 
in their attempt to make the stories congruent. No signifi­
cant difference was found, however, in the number of cause 
inferences made by the two groups. In other words, subjects 
seemed to replace the incongruent consequence node with one 
which was consistent with the cause of the story as expected 
during the recall. The subjects did not attempt, however, to 
make the cause node congruent with the manipulated node. The 
subjects apparently used the cause node as the basis for recall 
and fit the remainder of the story to the cause node. There­
fore, the notion that the cause node is more important to the 
receivers' schema is supported by this finding.
Confidence Factor
The final hypothesis suggested by the literature cited 
in the first chapter concerns the confidence level individuals
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express in recall. All of the literature discussed in the 
first chapter concerning inferences suggests that people make 
inferences as a natural part of the recall process. According 
to the literature, people make inferences so naturally that 
they are not aware of making inferences. If this is indeed 
so, an individual should express the same level of confidence 
in an inference as in the recall of information actually pre­
sented in the stimulus message. Because the literature sug­
gests that individuals are not aware of making inferences, the 
fifth hypothesis was stated in the null form:
Hg: There will be no significant difference in confi­
dence scores when subjects recall either inferences 
or information presented in the message.
For the most part, the data analysis failed to support 
this hypothesis. Hotelling's T Squares (see Table 7) were 
used to compare the mean confidence scores of each group pair­
ing suggested by the three components of the hypothesis. The 
first Hotelling's test produced a significant F value (p<.045). 
Furthermore, the testing of the individual variables by t-tests 
produced differences in the confidence scores of the CA and UA 
groups in response to the cause question. This finding sug­
gests that the CA group may have been aware that they were 
making inferences as they filled in the missing cause node. 
Unfortunately, the same result continued as the other two parts 
of the hypothesis were tested.
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The second analysis also produced a significant F 
value (p<.0004). This time, however, the t-tests revealed 
that the CQ group's confidence score on the consequence ques­
tion was not the same as the UA group's score in their 
responses to the same question (t=-2.48; p<.015). This finding 
suggests that the CQ group was aware that they were making 
inferences and that they remembered the information was not 
actually present in the story. If this was the case, the sub­
jects seemed to be willing to knowingly add information to a 
story in order to achieve closure and make a story fit their 
expectations.
The third component of the hypothesis was tested and 
once again, a significant F value was produced (p<.0004) when 
the confidence scores of the IC and UA groups were compared.
The t-tests however, revealed that there was no difference in 
the confidence expressed by the two groups in their responses 
to the congruency question. This finding supports the notion 
that the IC group was not aware that they were making infer­
ences which made the consequence node congruent with the rest 
of the story, thus, this portion of the hypothesis was sup­
ported. The difference in the mean confidence scores of the 
two groups was caused by the responses to the consequence ques­
tion (t=-2.46; p<.016). This difference was probably due to 
the fact that the answers to the two questions over the same 
node were similar but not identical. The difference in the 
possible answers may have caused the subjects to express a lack
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of confidence in their responses to the consequence question.
At this point however, the data seem to support the notion 
that the IC group was not aware that they were making congru­
ency inferences.
The results of this analysis also lend further support 
to the idea that the cause node is more cogent to the receiver's 
schema than the consequence node. Not only did subjects make 
more cause inferences when the node was missing compared with 
the number of inferences made when the consequence node was 
missing, they also expressed less discomfort in their cause 
inferences than subjects did their consequence inferences.
This suggests that the CA group might have been more confident 
of their cause inferences than the CQ group was of its conse­
quence inferences. To test this notion further, a post hoc 
Hotelling's T was performed on the confidence scores of the CA 
and CQ groups. As expected, the CA group expressed a higher 
level of confidence than did the CQ group (F=10.77; p<.0004).
Suggestions for Future Research
As suggested earlier in this study, future research 
needs to further explore how the manipulation of the cause and 
consequence nodes affects the recall of other story nodes.
The present study suggested that the deletion of the cause node 
might have affected the way subjects responded to the congru­
ency question which tapped the consequence node. No effect 
was evident on the recall of the cause however, when the
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consequence node was deleted. Since, as the discussion in 
Chapter I established, the cause and consequence nodes are 
both essential story nodes, the manipulation of one may not 
influence the recall of the other. However, the manipulation 
of the two nodes may affect how the story nodes are recalled.
To test this notion, the questionnaire used in this study 
must be expanded to include questions which tap the background 
and event nodes as well as the cause and consequence. Only 
when the instrument can test the recall of the other nodes can 
the question be truly answered.
Future research also needs to explore the effect of the 
incongruity of a variety of story nodes. This is especially 
relevant to testing the effect of an incongruent cause node, 
since that node seems to be so important to an individual's 
story schema. To test this idea, the cause node would need to 
be written so it would be judged as being incongruent with the 
rest of the story; much like the incongruent consequence nodes 
used in the present study. The notion that the presence of an 
incongruity in a story causes inferences in recall will only 
be truly substantiated if the effect occurs when nodes other 
than the consequence are incongruent.
A method of coping with free recall also needs to be 
developed in future research. The current methodology tends to 
shape recall by providing restricted choices. A pilot study 
conducted by the author and others attempted to test inference 
making in free recall (Fitch, Gorcyca, and Goss; 1979). The
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study had so many methodological problems that no significant 
finding could be reported. Perhaps if the two methodologies 
could be combined, the types of inferences made in free recall 
could be better explored. The first step would have subjects 
generating free responses to questions over the stories. The 
responses would then be used to develop the choices provided 
in a multiple choice questionnaire given to another set of sub­
jects. This type of method would help insure that the possible 
responses were similar to those that would be generated if the 
subjects could simply give any answer they wanted.
Another suggestion for future research is to add a time 
dimension to the study. By testing the effect of different 
intervals of time the question of whether inferences are more 
prevalent in the short run or over a long period could be 
addressed. The time factor should also be applied to the con­
fidence scores to find if time will add to or diminish the 
amount of confidence one feels about the accuracy of recall.
Another dimension that needs to be added in future 
research is a mode of delivery factor. None of the research 
discussed in the first chapter tested the possibility that the 
mode in which a message is presented might influence what type 
of information is remembered and what is forgotten. Therefore, 
research needs to examine whether subjects make more inferences 
when they listen to a message compared to reading a message. 
Research should also explore the possibility that different 
types of inferences might occur with the use of different
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delivery modes. The final suggestion for future research is 
to venture away from messages in story form and test the 
structure of expository messages to find if the structure of 
that type of message also influences how the information pro­
cessing system stores and reconstructs that type of message. 
Freedle and Hale (1979) suggest that expository information 
has categories which are very similar to the nodes of story 
structure. They also feel that individuals have schemata for 
expository messages which contain expectations that a message 
will be presented in a coherent manner. Very possibly, these 
expectations are as strong as the schemata for story structure 
illustrated in this study.
Summary
The experiment conducted in this study investigated the 
effect of story structure on recall. According to speculations 
presented in the first chapter, a receiver's schemata, or expec­
tations for the incoming information, would interact with the 
stimulus message and effect the way the message was recalled.
To test this, certain elements that previous research had found 
to be part of a common schema for stories were used in the 
stimulus material. The
placed into four different groups. Each group heard a differ­
ent story structure condition. The conditions were cause 
deleted, consequence deleted, incongruent, or unaltered. The 
group that heard the unaltered stories served as a baseline
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for data analysis. All three of the remaining groups were 
compared with the baseline group.
The results indicated that the structure of a story 
does interact with the receiver's story schema and influences 
how the story is recalled. All three manipulations caused 
statistical significance at or beyond the .05 level. The
study did not however, completely support the notion that
inferences are made with as much confidence as any other form 
of recall. The findings of the study are summarized below.
1. The deletion of a cause node prodiced an 
inferred cause in recall.
2. The deletion of a consequence node pro­
duced an inferred consequence in recall.
3. The effect on recall of the deletion of 
the cause node is stronger than the effect 
of the deletion of the consequence node.
4. A consequence which is incongruent caused
subjects to infer congruent consequences 
in an attempt to keep the message congru­
ent.
5. The inferences made when a story node was 
incongruent were made with as much confi­
dence as recall of congruent information, 
thus indicating that the subjects were not 
aware that they were making the story con­
gruent by making inferences.
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6. The inferences of a missing consequence 
node were made with less confidence than 
the recall of a node actually in the 
story, thus indicating that the subjects 
were aware that they were making infer­
ences.
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Nick Young has worked as manager of the information ser­
vices division of World Business Machines (WBM) for twelve 
years. His department's ratings have always been superior, and 
he is well liked by everyone with whom he works.
WBM has planned to make some personnel changes in the in­
formation services division so they can keep up with the changes 
in the high-technology industry and to conserve energy. All of 
the personnel changes will be subject to strict adherence to Af­
firmative Action guidelines.
Even though Nick and Jason Cole, his boss, agree that the 
changes will be good for the organization, Jason wants all of 
the plans kept quiet until the details have been finalized.
When Nick returned to his office he excitedly told his 
executive assistant, Wayne, about the proposed changes. At the 
next coffee break, Wayne accidentally mentioned that some big 
personnel changes were in the works while he chatted with a 
group of supervisors.
Nick's subordinates soon began to talk and rumors about 
lay offs began to spread. Morale began to drop and tardiness 
and absenteeism rose sharply. Work began to pile up and work 
quality dropped.
Nick had to begin spending all of his time writing per­
sonnel reports. He became very dissatisfied with his job.
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Jason picked up on Nick's signals and called Nick into his of­




Rachel Ruddy, a 50-year-old professional mid-manager at 
the City Bank of New Rochelle, had considered for quite some 
time having some extensive dental work. Although she made a 
point of having yearly checkups and cavities filled, she felt 
her appearance was affected by a badly discolored incisor, mis­
aligned teeth, and noticeable fillings.
Her first step was to ask her regular dentist. Dr. Luke, 
about possible improvements. He explained his procedure to her, 
The first phase, taking an impression, would cost $75. The $75 
would be subtracted later if she chose to have the work done.
After Rachel had the $4,900 work done on her teeth, she 
received the bill. However, she found that the $75 diagnostic 
fee had not been deducted. When Rachel protested the bill, the 
doctor's billing secretary maintained that Rachel misunderstood 
the initial fee and the doctor had already subtracted the fee.
Rachel was very angry about the misunderstanding about 




Pilot Smith wishes to fly from Airfield Alpha to Airfield 
Beta. The route between Alpha and Beta is over country seldom 
higher than 50 feet above sea level, but Airfield Beta itself is 
circled by low hills which are almost 400 feet above sea level. 
Weather stations along the route Smith intends to fly report the 
ceiling, the height of the cloud layer, in written reports every 
2 hours.
Smith checks the available data just prior to his depar­
ture for Beta and discovers that the last report, the 8:00 p.m. 
observation, only 1 hour old, states that the ceiling is unlim­
ited all the way to the hills around Beta, at which point it is
1,000 feet. This meant flying conditions were good.
Based on the information. Smith takes off from Alpha at 
9:10 p.m. in unsettled weather and heads directly for Beta.
As he nears Beta, he discovers that the ceiling is much lower 
than he had read in the report. He is forced to fly under 500 
feet to stay in visual contact with the ground since Smith has 
no experience flying on instruments only. Smith manages to get 
into Beta by slipping between hilltops and the clouds at great 
risk to his life.
When he gets on the ground, very frightened by the ex­
perience, he almost immediately meets the weather observer whose 
report led Smith to fly to Beta that evening. Smith's fear
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rapidly turns to anger, and he berates the observer severely, 
telling him that he is stupid and incompetent, and the inaccur­
ate report endangered the lives of everyone flying into Beta 
that night, and that he. Smith, intends to report the observer 




Nick Young has worked as manager of the information ser­
vices division of World Business Machines (WBM) for twelve 
years. His department's ratings have always been superior, and 
he is well liked by everyone with whom he works.
WBM has planned to make some personnel changes in the in­
formation services division so they can keep up with the changes 
in the high-technology industry and to conserve energy. All of 
the personnel changes will be subject to strict adherence to Af­
firmative Action guidelines.
Even though Nick and Jason Cole, his boss, agree that the 
changes will be good for the organization, Jason wants all of 
the plans kept quiet until the details have been finalized.
Nick's subordinates soon began to talk and rumors about 
lay offs began to spread. Morale began to drop and tardiness 
and absenteeism rose sharply. Work began to pile up and work 
quality dropped.
Nick had to begin spending all of his time writing per­
sonnel reports. He became very dissatisfied with his job.
Jason picked up on Nick's signals and called Nick into his of­




Rachel Ruddy, a 50-year-old professional mid-manager at 
the City Bank of New Rochelle, had considered for quite some 
time having some extensive dental work. Although she made a 
point of having yearly checkups and cavities filled, she felt 
her appearance was affected by a badly discolored incisor, mis­
aligned teeth, and noticeable fillings.
Her first step was to ask her regular dentist. Dr. Luke, 
about possible improvements. He explained his procedure to her. 
The first phase, taking an impression, would cost $75. The $75 
would be subtracted later if she chose to have the work done.
After she received the bill, Rachel protested it but the
doctor's billing secretary maintained that Rachel misunderstood
the initial fee and the doctor had already subtracted the fee.
3
Rachel was very angry about the misunderstanding about 




Pilot Smith wishes to fly from Airfield Alpha to Airfield 
Beta. The route between Alpha and Beta is over country seldom 
higher than 50 feet above sea level, but Airfield Beta itself is 
circled by low hills which are almost 400 feet above sea level. 
Weather stations along the route Smith intends to fly report the 
ceiling, the height of the cloud layer, in written reports every 
2 hours.
Based on the information. Smith takes off from Alpha at 
9:10 p.m. in unsettled weather and heads directly for Beta. As 
he nears Beta, he discovers that the ceiling is much lower than 
he had read in the report. He is forced to fly under 500 feet 
to stay in visual contact with the ground since Smith has no ex­
perience flying on instruments only. Smith manages to get into 
Beta by slipping between hilltops and the clouds at great risk 
to his life.
When he gets on the ground, very frightened by the exper­
ience, he almost immediately meets the weather observer whose 
report led Smith to fly to Beta that evening. Smith's fear 
rapidly turns to anger, and he berates the observer severely, 
telling him that he is stupid and incompetent, that the inac­
curate report endangered the lives of everyone flying into Beta 
that night, and that he. Smith, intends to report the observer 




Nick Young has worked as manager of the information ser­
vices division of World Business Machines (WBM) for twelve years. 
His department's ratings have always been superior, and he is 
well liked by everyone with whom he works.
WBM has planned to make some personnel changes in the in­
formation services division so they can keep up with the changes 
in the high-technology industry and to conserve energy. All of 
the personnel changes will be subject to strict adherence to Af­
firmative Action guidelines.
Even though Nick and Jason Cole, his boss, agree that the 
changes will be good for the organization, Jason wants all of 
the plans kept quiet until the details have been finalized.
When Nick returned to his office he excitedly told his 
executive assistant, Wayne, about the proposed changes. At the 
next coffee break, Wayne accidentally mentioned that some big 
personnel changes were in the works while he chatted with a 
group of supervisors.
Nick's subordinates soon began to talk and rumors about 
lay offs began to spread. Morale began to drop and tardiness 





Rachel Ruddy, a 50-year-old professional mid-manager at 
the City Bank of New Rochelle, had considered for quite some 
time having some extensive dental work. Although she made a 
point of having yearly checkups and cavities filled, she felt 
her appearance was affected by a badly discolored incisor, mis­
aligned teeth, and noticeable fillings.
Her first step was to ask her regular dentist. Dr. Luke, 
about possible improvements. He explained his procedure to her. 
The first phase, taking an impression, would cost $75. The $75 
would be subtracted later if she chose to have the work done.
After Rachel had the $4,900 work done on her teeth, she 
received the bill. However, she found that the $75 diagnostic 
fee had not been deducted. When Rachel protested the bill, the 
doctor's billing secretary maintained that Rachel misunderstood 




Pilot Smith wishes to fly from Airfield Alpha to Airfield 
Beta. The route between Alpha and Beta is over country seldom 
higher than 50 feet above sea level, but Airfield Beta itself is 
circled by low hills which are almost 400 feet above sea level. 
Weather stations along the route Smith intends to fly report the 
ceiling, the height of the cloud layer, in written reports every 
2 hours.
Smith checks the available data just prior to his depar­
ture for Beta and discovers that the last report, the 8:00 p.m. 
observation, only 1 hour old, states that the ceiling is unlim­
ited all the way to the hills around Beta, at which point it is
1,000 feet. This meant flying conditions were good.
Based on the information. Smith takes off from Alpha at 
9:10 p.m. in unsettled weather and heads directly for Beta. As 
he nears Beta, he discovers that the ceiling is much lower than 
he had read in the report. He is forced to fly under 500 feet 
to stay in visual contact with the ground since Smith has no ex­
perience flying on instruments only. Smith manages to get into 





Nick Young has worked as manager of the information ser­
vices division of World Business Machines (WBM) for twelve 
years. His department's rating have always been superior, and 
he is well liked by everyone with whom he works.
Because of energy shortages in the paper industry, and 
because of new developments in the high-technology industry,
WBM plans to make some significant modifications in the informa­
tion services division. Any personnel changes resulting from 
these modifications will be subject to strict adherence to Af­
firmative Action guidelines.
Nick and his boss agree that the changes will be good for 
the organization and the employees. Nick's boss has asked Nick 
to avoid discussing any of these planned changes until all of 
the details have been finalized. However, Nick's Administrative 
Assistant didn't maintain the confidentiality and leaked to one 
of the workers that "some big changes were going to take place, 
and they had something to do with Affirmative Action."
Nick's subordinates begin to talk. Rumors are spread 
about lay offs. Morale begins to drop noticeably. Tardiness 
and absenteeism rise sharply. Work begins to pile up, and work 
quality starts to drop.
Nick becomes very dissatisfied with his job; his boss 
picks up on Nick's signals and calls Nick into his office to
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Rachel Ruddy, a 50-year-old professional mid-manager at 
the City Bank of New Rochelle, had been considering for quite 
some time having some extensive dental work. Although she made 
a point of having yearly checkups and cavities filled, she felt 
her appearance was affected by a badly discolored incisor, mis­
aligned teeth, and noticeable fillings.
Her first step was to ask her regular dentist. Dr. Luke 
about possible improvements. He explained his procedure to her. 
The first phase, taking an impression, would cost $75. The $75 
would be subtracted later if she chose to have the work done.
After Rachel had the $4,900 work done on her teeth, she 
received the bill. However, she found that the $75 diagnostic 
fee had not been deducted. When Rachel protested the bill, the 
doctor's billing secretary maintained that Rachel had misunder­
stood the initial fee and the doctor had already subtracted the 
fee.
Rachel shrugged her shoulders and set up an appointment 





Pilot Smith wishes to fly from Airfield Alpha to Airfield 
Beta. The route between Alpha and Beta is over country seldom 
higher than 50 feet above sea level, but Airfield Beta itself is 
circled by low hills which are almost 400 feet above sea level. 
Weather stations along the route Smith intends to fly report the 
ceiling, the height of the cloud layer, in written reports every 
2 hours.
Smith checks the available data just prior to his depar­
ture for Beta and discovers that the last report, the 8:00 p.m. 
observation, just 1 hour old, states that the ceiling is unlim­
ited all the way to the hills around Beta, at which point it is
1,000 feet. This meant flying conditions were good.
Based on the information. Smith takes off from Alpha at 
9:10 p.m. in unsettled weather and heads directly for Beta. As 
he nears Beta, he discovers that the ceiling is much lower than 
he had read in the report. He is forced to fly under 500 feet 
to stay in visual contact with the ground since Smith has no ex­
perience flying on instruments only. Smith manages to get into 
Beta by slipping between hilltops and the clouds at great risk 
to his life.
When he gets on the ground, very frightened by the exper­
ience, he almost immediately meets the weather observer whose 
faulty report led Smith to fly to Beta that evening. Smith
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invited the weather observer to have a beer with him and thanked 




Here are a few questions over the three case studies you 
heard in class last time. Please circle the answer you feel is 
correct. After answering each question, indicate how confident 
you are in your answer by circling the number which most closely 
reflects your degree of confidence.
EXAMPLE;
When Mary went to the desk, she
a. reread the letter.
^ b ^  wrote a quick reply.
c. doodled absentmindedly.
d. Story doesn't say.






1. When Nick's boss calls him into the office, he
a. counsels Nick.
b. informs Nick of the information leak.
c. tells Nick to tell the employees about the policy change.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
2. World Business Machines was making changes to
a. outdo the competition.
b. add new technical innovations.
c. meet Affirmative Action requirements.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
3. Employee problems were caused by
a. Nick's disagreement with his boss.
b. Nick's strange behavior.
c. a leak by Wayne during a break.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
4. In the conversation between Nick and his boss, the boss
a. discussed Nick's unhappiness.
b. angrily told Nick that he would not get a promotion.
c. suggested that Nick get a new assistant.
d. Story doesn't say.






1. Rachel had dental work done because
a. she wanted to enhance her appearance.
b. she wanted to do business with the dentist.
c. she liked the dentist's frankness about the cost.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
2. Rachel discussed her bill with the billing secretary because
a. the dentist did not subtract the $75 fee.
b. the bill was not itemized.
c. she felt the bill was much lower than the doctor had es­
timated .
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2 - 3 4 5  Very Confident
3. When a misunderstanding developed between Rachel and her 
dentist, she
a. decided to have him remove the dental work.
b. decided to have further dental work done by the specialist.
c. decided to retain an attorney.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
4. Because Rachel was unhappy with her dentist, she
a. decided to pay all but $75 of the bill.
b. decided to cease doing business with Dr. Luke.
c. decided to follow Dr. Luke's recommendation.
d. Story doesn't say.






1. Pilot Smith took off for Beta because
a. he wanted to meet the weather reporting crew.
b. he needed to make a cross country flight.
c. the weather report indicated good flying conditions.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
2. When Smith arrived at Beta, he
a. checks the current weather report.
b. berates the weather man.
c. collapses from the strain of the flight.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
3. Smith's flight from Alpha to Beta
a. was done without reading the weather bulletins.
b. was done by following instrument readings.
c. was extremely dangerous because of low clouds.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
4. When Smith meets the weather reporter, he
a. purposely ignores him.
b. vents his frustration and anger.
c. buys him a beer out of appreciation.
d. Story doesn't say.
Not Confident 1 2  3 4 5 Very Confident
